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Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation
for Temporary Taking
States and municipalities are presently enacting, at a rapidly increasing
rate, statutes and ordinances to preserve individual historic structures.1
This comment will analyze these laws in order to determine whether
the governmental restrictions, imposed to provide public bodies with
time in which to effect measures to preserve the landmark, constitute
valid regulatory controls of land or represent unconstitutional takings
of property without just compensation.2
Early legislation dealing with landmarks centered on the creation
of historic districts through the employment of zoning regulations.3
Although the constitutionality of these enactments has been questioned,
the courts have consistently sustained them as valid police power mea-
sures designed to promote the public welfare.4 The body of statutory
1 E.g., Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 121,971, April 30, 1962; NEw YoRr, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ch. 8A (Supp. 1967); PHLADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-2008 (1956). For a general com-
pilation of historic preservation statutes and ordinances, see J. MoRRsoN, IsToRic PRES-
ERVATION LAW 61-186 (2d ed. 1965).
2 The line between a valid regulation of private property and a taking of private
property without just compensation is by no means distinct. Generally, property may be
regulated-without compensation-if the restrictions are based on the police power
of the state to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public through
the prohibition of injurious uses of private property. See 1 P. Nlcnors, EMINENT DOMA N
§ 1.42[2] (3d rev. ed. J. Sackman 1964); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926); A. DUNHAM, MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 35-40 (2d ed. 1958). A taking
involves appropriation of the property, or an interest therein, for public use or enjoyment
and, under the fourteenth amendment and state constitutional due process clauses, gives
rise to the owner's right to just compensation for the lost property interest. 1 P. NicasoLs,
supra. Regulation not justified by the police power may so deprive an owner of the use
and enjoyment of his property that it effectively constitutes an unconstitutional taking
of the property without compensation. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).
3 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40C, §§ 1-13 (1966); NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE ch. 65 (1956);
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADmI. CODE ch. 8A (Supp. 1967); Providence, RI., Zoning Ordinance
ch. 1342, August 5, 1960; SANTA FE, N.M., CODE ch. 28 (1953). See Note, The Police
Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 CoLum. L. Rzv.
708, 713-14 (1963).
4 Although it is difficult to argue that historic district laws fall within the scope of
traditional police power control of health, safety, and morals, it is possible to sustain
these enactments under two elements of the broader concept of general welfare. First,
there is some support for the use of zoning regulations to promote aesthetic objectives,
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert.
denied, 350 US. 841 (1955), and, to a certain extent, aesthetic considerations have been
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law governing historic districts is, therefore, based on favorable judicial
precedent and, to the extent that new statutes are patterned on older
enactments, they appear certain to be sustained as a permissible exercise
of the police power.5
In many cities, however, structures of obvious architectural and his-
toric value stand as isolated landmarks that cannot easily be included
in historic districts. 6 To preserve these structures, some cities have
adopted statutes directed toward individual landmarks. Although each
of these enactments displays a varying approach, a basic pattern is ap-
parent. Initially, a public agency is empowered to designate appropri-
ate structures as landmarks. 7 If the owner of a designated landmark
wishes to alter or to demolish-his property, he must inform the agency
and apply for permission to do so. Should it object to the alteration
or demolition,8 the public body may deny the permit for a period of
from three to six months. During this time, the agency may undertake
steps to preserve the structure, either by convincing the owner that he
should not change the landmark, by persuading an appropriate govern-
mental body to exercise its power of eminent domain, or by finding a
private group that is willing to purchase the structure and preserve it.
If the agency, at the end of the delay period, fails to develop a preser-
vation plan, it must allow the owner to proceed with demolition. 9
upheld as a basis for historic district laws. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333
Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955). Second, and more importantly, the ideal of general
welfare includes the economic benefits resulting from the stabilization of property values
and the increase in tourist revenues in an historic district. City of New Orleans v. Perga-
ment, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, supra. For a
discussion of the validation of police power control of historic districts on the grounds
of economic benefit as an element of general welfare, see Note, supra note 3, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. at 715-16.
5 Note, supra note 3, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. at 732.
6 Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, 22 N.Y.U. INmTA. L. REv. 99, 102 (1967).
7 Because of dissimilarities in architectural styles and historic periods, the guidelines
for determining appropriate structures vary widely: Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 121,971,
April 30, 1962 (buildings, site or structures of importance or significance in the cultural,
economic or social history of the city, state or nation, or identified with historic events or
persons); NEw YoREc, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, § 207-1.OK (Supp. 1967) (any improvement,
any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a special character or special
historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural
characteristics of the city, state or nation); PHUADELUHA, PA., CODE § 14-2008 (1956)
(historic buildings which are important to the education, culture, traditions, and eco-
nomic values of the city).
8 Since preservation agencies have the responsibility of protecting landmarks, it would
seem to follow that they are required to object to the demolition of any structure which
they have designated as having historic importance. Nevertheless, the agencies' powers of
objection are usually discretionary. See, e.g., NEw YoRx, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A,
§§ 207-1.0b, 207-6.0b (Supp. 1967).
S In most cities, the statutes envision a simple procedure for applying their provisions.
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The most important elements of the preservation statutes authorize
agencies to prevent the alteration or demolition of privately owned
structures while the public attempts to preserve the landmark. Since
these laws have not, for the most part, been construed by the courts,
they can most readily be analyzed by reference to other instances in
which public agencies, without recourse to a zoning enactment, have
restrained the rights of owners to improve or change the use of private
property.
I. PROHIBITION OF ALTERATION OR DEMOLITION
There are two major lines of cases in which governmental restric-
tions similar to those permitted by the landmarks enactments have
been challenged in the courts: (1) those situations in which public
bodies have prevented the development of private property because it
may later be appropriated by the public-so-called "freezing" cases;' 0
(2) those instances involving building "set-back" requirements."
Although roughly analogous factual situations occur in each line of
cases, the courts have struck down the activities involved in the "freez-
ing" cases as takings of property without just compensation and have
In Charleston, South Carolina, the Board of Architectural Review may postpone the
demolition of pre-1860 structures for not less than three months to consult with the city
council and private groups about possible preservation measures. CHARLsTON, S.C., CODE
ch. 49, art. X, § 49-46 (1959). The Philadelphia Historical Commission may postpone
demolition of designated landmarks for up to six months while it consults civic groups
and public agencies to ascertain how the structure can be preserved. PnHEADmLHI, PA.,
CODE § 14-2008 (1956). When the Los Angeles Cultural Heritage Board has designated an
historic site as a landmark, no demolition may be undertaken without the Board's
approval. Demolition permits may be suspended for thirty to 180 days to allow the Board
time to take steps to preserve the structure. If it cannot do so, the owner may proceed
without the Board's approval. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 121,971, April 30, 1962. The
procedure in New York, while analogous to that in other cities, is much more complex.
NEw Yo~a, N.Y., ADmIN. CODE ch. 8A, § 207-8.0 (Supp. 1967).
10 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893); State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry,
5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 214 N.E.2d 684 (1964); State ex rel. Dillie Laboratories Corp. v.
Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d 164 (1958); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio
App. 258, 125 N.E.2d 355, appeal dismissed per curiam, 162 Ohio St. 280, 122 N.E.2d 792
(1954); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
11 Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); Rochester Business
Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966); Roer Constr.
Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 136 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Vangellow
v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947); State ex rel. Miller
v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
"Set-back" laws enable cities to enact official street maps showing the location of proposed
but unopened streets as well as existing ways that will eventually be widened. An
owner whose property abuts on one of these streets cannot obtain a building permit
for an improvement that will encroach on land lying in the bed of a proposed street
unless he can show that the restrictions cause a substantial decrease in the value of and
fair return from his land. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Crry LAw § 35.
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upheld the "set-back" requirements as valid regulation of private
property.
The circumstances involved in the "freezing" cases arise after an
administrative agency refuses to issue a building permit to improve
property that may be condemned,' 2 or a legislative body enacts a statute
which, on its face, does not prohibit the development of the land, but
instead denies compensation for improvements made after the govern-
ment designates the property for possible appropriation.'3 These re-
straints on development may last for a definite14 or an indefinite'8 period
of time. During the time that the public restricts the property, the
owner finds himself in a position of discharging the responsibilities
asssociated with the possession of property-such as paying taxes' 6-
without being allowed the free use of his land.'7
Even though the public does not attempt to exercise physical domin-
ion over the land, some courts have taken the position that:
Whenever a law deprives the owner of the beneficial use and
free enjoyment of his property, or imposes restraints upon
such use and enjoyment, that materially affect its value, with-
out legal process or compensation, it deprives him of his
property within the meaning of the Constitution. 8
In the absence of a valid justification for regulation, such as the pre-
vention of injurious uses of private property, most courts, realizing that
"[a]ll that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the fruits of
that use,"' 9 have consistently held that the governmental actions in the
"freezing" cases were unconstitutional takings of private property. 20
12 State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 214 N.E.2d 684 (1964);
State ex rel. Dillie Laboratories Corp. v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d 164
(1958).
13 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls,
368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
14 Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951) (three years from pas-
sage of original ordinance).
15 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893) (until the city decides to appropriate
the land).
16 Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 264, 125 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1954).
17 Admittedly, zoning restrictions may prevent an owner from using property in the
manner in which he chooses, note 2 supra, but none of the cases under discussion here
involves the restraint of property through the employment of a general zoning ordinance,
nor do the agencies attempt to justify their actions on the ground that the proposed
use would be inimical to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Is Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977 (1893). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 197, 82 A.2d 34, 38 (1951), quoted
this language as support for the invalidation of a "freezing" action.
'9 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977 (1893); Miller v. City of Beaver
Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 197, 82 A.2d 34, 38 (1951). Accord, State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry,
5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 194, 214 N.E.2d 684, 686 (1964).
20 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977 (1893) ("Whenever a law deprives
1968]
The University of Chicago Law Review
The broad statement that owners are deprived of an inherent right
to "the beneficial use and free enjoyment" of their property, however,
does not satisfactorily isolate the elements of the taking. Although some
courts have argued generally that the owner was deprived of the "use"
of the property,21 he has clearly not been denied all of the "use," since
holding the land as a vacant lot would, in a sense, make "use" of it.
More specifically, however, the underlying facts in each of these cases
shows that the owner was actually deprived of the right to "build" on
his land.22 The courts which have considered the "freezing" of private
property, then, have invalidated public actions substantially like those
authorized by the landmark preservation laws 23-- the denial of an
owner's right to "build" on or improve his property, even though he
may maintain the existing "use" of the land.
A second element of the "freezing" cases which some courts have
attacked is the actual or potential loss of economic value resulting from
the restrictions on the property.24 If, like courts, rational purchasers
are interested in an owner's right to "build" on property,25 restricted
land would not be in great demand and might even be "practically
unsalable." 2r Thus, in the cases in which private property is "frozen"
-just as in those instances in which public agencies might impose con-
trols upon landmarks-the owner's right to alienate his property would
the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his property ...without legal
process or compensation, it deprives him of his property within the meaning of the con-
stitution.'). Accord, State ex rel. Dillie Laboratories Corp. v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App.
541, 542, 156 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1958); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 264, 125
N.E.2d 355, 858 (1954). See generally 2 P. Nicnoms, EMINENT DOM IN §§ 6.8, 6.4 (3d rev.
J. Sackman ed. 1964).
21 See cases cited note 20 supra.
22 State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 214 N.E.2d 684 (1964)
(owner denied building permit for improvement and alteration of structure on his land);
State ex rel. Dillie Laboratories v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541, 156 N.E.2d 164 (1958)
(owner denied permit to erect new structure on his land); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97
Ohio App. 258, 125 N.E.2d 355 (1954) (owner denied permit to build gas station on
vacant lot); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951) (owner denied
compensation for houses erected on vacant land which city might later condemn).
23 See note 9 supra.
24 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584-85, 32 N.E. 976, 977 (1893) ("[A]s this circumstance
[deprivation of the owner's right to build on his property] obviously impaired its value
and interfered with his power of disposition, it [the statute] was to that extent void as to
him .. . ."); State ex rel. Mumma v. Stansberry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 191, 194, 214 N.E.2d
684, 686 (1964) ("Mhe value of property is dependent upon its actual or potential use.').
25 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
26 Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 194, 82 A.2d 34, 86 (1951); accord, Forster
v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893) (potential purchaser refused to accept deed to
land because of restrictions on building); Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 125
N.E.2d 855 (1954) (oil company would purchase property only if it could obtain permission
to build gas station).
[Vol. 35:362
Landmark Preservation Laws
be abridged because he could sell only to those persons not interested
in changing the land. In addition, the owner who chose to sell would
suffer a financial loss because the lack of a competitive market demand
for the property would tend to depress its price.27
Loss of economic value suggests a further, although implicit, reason
for judicial invalidation of the public activity presented in the "freez-
ing" cases. Because the market value of restricted property is depressed,
an owner is faced with the prospect of reduced "just compensation"
should the public decide to appropriate his land.28 It is possible that
some courts have opposed the imposition of nonregulatory controls
because they believe that the public should not be allowed to benefit
by awarding artificially depressed compensation as a result of its own
actions.2 9
In the building "set-back" cases, cities have enacted official street
maps showing the location of proposed but unopened streets as well as
existing ways that will eventually be widened. An owner whose prop-
erty abuts on one of these streets cannot obtain a building permit for
an improvement that will encroach on land lying in the bed of a pro-
posed street unless he can show that the restrictions cause a substantial
decrease in the value of and fair return from his land.30 Since the "set-
back" laws also authorize governmental controls on private property
without compensation to the owner, the decisions upholding them will
bring the concepts set forth in the "freezing" cases into clear relief.
27 In a more abstract sense, "value" may also be related to the "use" of the land. If
"beneficial use and free enjoyment" is a right unto itself, there may be some inherent
noneconomic "value" to an owner who possesses the power to deal freely with his land.
28 When there is an ascertainable market value, courts have traditionally employed it
as a measure for determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in eminent
domain proceedings. When the market value is not available, the judiciary has relied
on so-called actual, or "intrinsic," value, which may be based on such factors as original
cost, assessed value, or sales of comparable property. 4 P. NIcHoS, EMENENT DoMAIN § 12.1,
at 17-21 (3d rev. ed. J. Sackman 1962). At best, if the controls imposed on property destroy
the market, the compensation will be artificial when compared to the possibility that
an award might have been based on a known market value demand for developable land.
See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1945). If the factors influencing the court
are original cost or assessed value, the amount may even be very low.
29 In none of the cases involving "freezing" have the courts expressly stated that the
public's activities were invalidated on these grounds. In Heale v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio
App. 258, 125 N.E.2d 355 (1954), however, the argument was advanced that the cost of
appropriating land would be substantially decreased if building on the property was
prevented. The court merely noted the position in its concluding paragraph, as it struck
down the "freezing." Cf. Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n,
218 Md. 236, 241, 146 A.2d 558, 560-61 (1958) (zoning ordinance cannot be used as a
substitute for eminent domain by depressing property values and thereby reducing
amount to be paid upon appropriation).
30 E.g., N.Y. GEN. Cry LAw § 35.
1968]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Like the sweeping language classifying the activities involved in the
"freezing" cases as takings of property without just compensation, broad
terms have been employed to uphold "set-back" requirements as "regu-
latory in character ... intended for a public purpose and to advance
the general welfare." 3'1 This description is a conclusion, however, and
the constituent elements of these activities must be examined to deter-
mine why "set-back" restrictions have been sustained.
"Set-back" requirements have been sustained if, despite the impo-
sition of restrictions on a portion of the land, the property can still be
reasonably used as the owner chooses.32 On the other hand, restrictions
making it impracticable for an owner to employ his property as he had
planned, although he might be able to use the land in another way,
have been struck down.33 Even though the "set-back" laws may prevent
improvement of land abutting on a mapped street, they cannot be em-
ployed to deny an owner his right to freely develop the bulk of his
property.
A second redeeming factor of the "set-back" laws is a "saving clause"
which empowers the public agency to grant a building permit in those
instances in which "the land within such mapped street or highway is
not yielding a fair return on its value to the owner. '3 4 Under this pro-
vision, controls causing minimal economic loss due to increased cost
to develop land or decreased income from improvements have been
31 Roer Constr. Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 50, 136 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
32 In Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936), a property owner
challenged the constitutionality of an official street map, filed pursuant to state statute,
showing the proposed widening of an avenue upon which his land abutted. The court
refused to rule on the validity of the law because the owner could not show that the
restrictions on building in any way damaged his present use of the property as a residence,
and he did not allege any change in use which might be affected by the restrictions.
See Rochester Business Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d
274 (1966) where, despite a "set-back" requirement causing the owner to suffer a 7.1 per
cent land loss, he could still erect a proposed office building with substantially the same
floor space, with a cost increase of only six per cent, by adding one or two more floors.
3 In Roer Constr. Corp. v. City of New Rochelle, 207 Misc. 46, 136 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), the court held an amended street map to be an unconstitutional interference
with property rights when it included almost all of the property upon which the owner
had planned to build an apartment building within the bed of a proposed highway. See
also Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947). But see
State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957) ("set-back" require-
ment upheld and building permit denied even though most of the owner's property lay
within the boundaries of a proposed street).
84 N.Y. GEN. Crry LAW § 35. It is instructive to note that Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577,
32 N.E. 976 (1893), a case in which the New York Court of Appeals found an unconstitu-
tional taking of property without compensation (see text accompanying note 18 supra),
involved an early version of the official map law which did not contain a "saving clause."
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upheld,35 while restrictions that would substantially decrease the eco-
nomic value of or income from property have been struck down. 36 "Set-
back" requirements are valid only to the extent that the owner suffers
no substantial loss in the value of his property, a position guaranteed
by the existence of a "saving clause."
It has been suggested that a valid objective of the "set-back" laws
is the limitation of any damage that might occur, both to the public
and to the landowner, if the property were appropriated for street
purposes. 37 Although this appears to be an express affirmation of the
use of public restrictions to depress the value of private property, there
are two definite limitations on this power. First, by the terms of the
"saving clauses," the public cannot prevent development when the re-
turn from or the value of the land is impaired. Second, the courts have
upheld the restrictions only when they have prevented the free use
of a small portion of the property and not when they have prohibited
full development of a large part of the land.38 Thus, the saving of pub-
lic funds is, in a sense, a by-product of the building "set-back" laws
and can occur only if the owner's interests have first been protected.
In view of the three major issues-ability of a landowner to build
upon and improve all of his property, protection of economic value,
and the employment of governmental power to minimize the cost of
public appropriation-analyzed by the courts in the "freezing" and
"set-back" cases, landmark preservation statutes authorize public actions
amounting to takings of private property without just compensation.
First, and most importantly, these laws prevent the owner from
changing the use of his property during the period in which a public
agency searches for a means of preservation. 39 The restriction goes to
the entire tract of land upon which the historic structure stands and
not just a portion thereof. Since courts are interested in the ability of
an owner to build on his property,40 the fact that the landmark statutes
permit the owner to retain the structure and use it in the existing man-
35 Rochester Business Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d
274 (1966).
36 Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The
importance of maintaining the value of land is even more apparent in those decisions
where courts have sustained "set-back" requirements which confer an economic benefit
on an owner. Thus, "set-back" laws may be upheld because they increase the value of an
owner's property by assuring him easy access to it. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N,.
197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
37 See State ex el. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 376, 86 N.W.2d 469, 475 (1957).
38 Notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
39 Note 9 and accompanying text supra.
40 Note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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ner is not significant. The owner is deprived of the right of free use
and enjoyment because he cannot build upon and improve his property
as he chooses, and thus an important element of a taking is created.41
Second, because the public will not allow change or improvement,
the market for the property may disappear-or at least be constricted-
with a consequent impairment of the owner's right of alienation and
a decline in the value of the land.4 2 In addition, the landmark property
may be deteriorating and expensive to maintain. The statutes, how-
ever, have no counterpart for the "saving clause" in the "set-back"
laws,43 so the owner is faced with the possibility of substantial economic
loss with no possibility of relief.
Third, although agencies may not be attempting to benefit the public
by reducing acquisition costs of historic property, if the imposition of
controls depresses the market value of the land, public funds will be
saved in subsequent appropriation proceedings. If the reduction of
public expenditures can occur only after the owner's development and
economic rights are protected,44 then any argument that the statutes
save public funds must fall because those rights are severely impaired.
The landmark preservation statutes, which empower public agencies
to develop preservation schemes while withholding alteration or demo-
lition permits, display features similar to those struck down in the
"freezing" cases: the prohibition of building upon or improvement of
property, a decline in the economic value of land, and the saving of
condemnation funds as a result of public restriction. At the same time,
those elements which led to the validation of "set-back" requirements
-the ability of the owner to continue to use his property as he chooses
41 Notes 19-22, 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
42 Notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
43 E.g., N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 35; notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. Although
N.Y. GEN. Crry LAws § 20 (25-a) authorizes local bodies to remit real estate taxes to the
owners of historic structures, the provision in NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A,
§ 207-8.0 (Supp. 1967), is designed to effect a permanent scheme whereby the owner may
preserve the property and is not intended to be applied to the economic loss caused by the
temporary prohibition of alteration or demolition. To the extent that an owner accepts
a rebate of taxes as an inducement to maintain his structure, the allowance will function
somewhat like a "saving clause" by reducing challenges to the constitutionality of the
prohibitions on demolition placed on specific parcels of property. If an owner contests
the amount of the rebate as insufficient, however, the judiciary will be forced to assess
the award. Since it is questionable whether the rebate formula would be upheld as a just
award for appropriated property, see Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, 22
INraA. L. RaV. 99, 107-108 (1967), the courts will probably turn to a scheme like that
presented in Part II infra in order to determine what an owner's just compensation should
be. In addition, the rebate of taxes is not primarily designed to provide the public with
a temporary period in which to decide whether and how a given landmark can be saved-
one of the major objectives of the preservation laws.
44 Notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
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and the existence of the "saving clause" to insure a fair return on the
property-are not present. It follows that the preservation statutes
authorize takings of property for which the owner must be compen-
sated.
II. COMPENSATION FOR RESTRICTIONS ON ALTERATION OR DEMOLITION
Since landmark preservation laws authorize public agencies to impose
controls and restrictions that constitute a taking of private property,
without providing compensation to the owner, they appear to be un-
constitutional on their face. It is possible, however, that these statutes
could be sustained if a method can be devised to reimburse an owner
for losses suffered during the period in which the property is regulated.
Thus, both the public's need for time to work out a method of pre-
serving a landmark and the owner's constitutional right to just com-
pensation for a taking of his property could be satisfied.
Following the restriction of the landmark, public agencies must pur-
sue one of two alternatives: (1) they can develop a plan whereby the
structure is preserved through public or private appropriation, or
(2) should they fail to effect a means of maintaining the landmark, the
agencies must remove the controls and permit the owner to proceed
with alteration or demolition. 45 Assuming that the public must select
one of these two alternatives, it is possible to establish a scheme of
payment that will compensate the owner for any losses incurred through
the imposition of regulations on his property.
If public or private bodies condemn the property, an owner is con-
stitutionally guaranteed just compensation for his land from the time
at which it is taken.46 In order to ensure to the owner a just award,
two elements of compensation must be satisfied: first, the amount must
be based on the fair market value of the property47 immediately prior
to the time it is restricted; 48 and second, the owner must be made whole
from the initial point at which the taking occurred 4 -- the time at which
the landmark was restricted.
By paying the owner the fair market value of his property before its
alteration or demolition was prevented, any changes in the value of the
land resulting from the actions of the landmark agency would be elimi-
45 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
46 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Scott v.
United States, 146 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1944); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655
(E.D. Mich. 1966).
47 4 P. Ncnois, EmmrNT DomAiN § 12.1 at 17-21 (Sd rev. ed. J. Sackman 1962).
48 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp.
655 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
49 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
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nated.50 The public could derive no benefit from its own restrictions
when it finally condemns the property. The owner, on the other hand,
would not be relegated to the position of receiving only the worth of
the property as an historic landmark without regard to any higher
value which the market might place on the land because of unrealized,
but potential, utilization.5 1
Since the right to compensation arises at the time at which property
is taken,52 any award must include an amount to cover the loss of the
property between the time that it is taken and the time that compen-
sation is actually paid. This result is generally achieved by paying an
owner statutory interest on the fair market value of the property,
beginning at the time of taking.5 3 The interest is not merely a return
on the condemnation award, but rather is an equivalent of the use of
the property lost through the appropriation.5 4
The theory that treats interest as an equivalent of use gives rise to
a further consideration. Restrictions imposed on property pursuant to
landmark enactments are not a physical invasion of the land and do
not prevent an owner from occupying the structure. An owner who
remains in possession of historic property, therefore, may not be entitled
to an equivalent of use of the land as an element of his compensation. 55
50 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311
136 N.W.2d 896 (1965).
51 In addition, it should be relatively easy to ascertain the fair market value of the
property before the imposition of controls-easier, perhaps, than determining the worth
of the property as a landmark. Assuming that the market assigns a higher value to the
best use of a piece of property than to any other, the fact that a rational owner requests
permission to destroy a landmark in order to alter the present utilization of the land
suggests that an active market is making demands for a better use of the property
which should be capable of ascertainment. At the same time, there may be no market
demands for the property employed as a landmark, a fact that would make the determina-
tion of its fair market value somewhat more difficult.
52 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
53 Id.
54 United States v. Certain Land in the City of St. Louis, 41 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Mo. 1941),
aff'd sub nom. O'Donnell v. United States, 131 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1942). The rule that in-
terest is an equivalent of use may originally have developed because the courts felt that an
owner should be made whole for his losses during the period between appropriation of
property and actual payment, even though statutory interest did not normally run against
the government on unliquidated debts. In re Post Office Site in Borough of the Bronx, 210
F. 832 (2d Cir. 1914). By relying on the terms of the constitutional guarantee that "prop-
erty shall not be taken without just compensation, the courts were able to develop the fic-
tion that an equivalent for the use of the taken property could be given, for which the stat-
utory interest rate, based on fair market value, seemed to be a reasonable measure, without
upsetting the rule restricting interest on uniiquidated claims. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). Thus, whatever the rule on interest running on
unliquidated claims against the government may presently be, the doctrine that interest
in eminent domain cases is an equivalent for use still stands.
55 Courts appear to be in conflict over compensation for the time between a taking
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The loss to which the owner is being subjected by the taking, however,
is not of the occupation of the property in its existing state, but of that
better use available through alteration or demolition. If we assume that
the fair market value of the unrestricted property on which the statu-
tory interest is to be based is greater than the value of the site as a
controlled landmark because it reflects a better use to which the prop-
erty might be put,56 then it is clear that an owner should be allowed
to recover a larger sum which reflects his real loss of the equivalent of
use of the unrestricted property, rather than being given only that value
attributable to possession of the existing structure. In order to ensure
that the owner does not receive more than the equivalent of use of the
uncontrolled property, however, the value of his occupation of the
landmark should be set off against the amount of the statutory interest
on the fair market value of the unrestricted property.57
Thus, in those instances in which the public chooses to condemn
the property, the owner should be compensated for the taking by means
of a formula which allows him the fair market value of the unrestricted
property, plus statutory interest from the point at which the controls
were imposed set off by an amount attributable to his possession of
the restricted property.
If public agencies are unable to develop a plan to preserve a land-
mark, they must allow the owner to proceed with alteration or demo-
lition. The property is lost for only a limited time-the period when
and the actual award if the owner remains in possession of the property. Annot., 56
A.L.R,2d 458 (1954). Compare United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Man-
hattan, 266 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (owner entitled to equivalent of use and posses-
sion of the property), with Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (ED. Mich. 1966)
(value of possession of property is set off against equivalent of use), and United States
v. Certain Land in City of St. Louis, 41 F. Supp. 809 (ED. Mo. 1941) (owner cannot
recover equivalent of use for period while he was in possession).
56 See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
57 See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 255 b(b). Admittedly, the application of this set-off
formula may involve two variables based on differing premises. The statutory interest
rate applied to the fair market value before the imposition of controls is an estimate
of the equivalent of the use of the property. The possessory value of the landmark,
especially in instances where the property is rented, may often be the actual amount. If
the primary concern, however, is to secure just compensation for the owner of taken
property, then the object must be to guarantee him the equivalent of use of the land
without regard to government restrictions, a figure which courts feel is best approximated
by the statutory interest rate in those cases where the owner is not, in fact, able to
develop the land to its highest and best potential. The fact that an actual figure is used
as a set-off has no real effect on this formula except as it prevents the owner from
receiving more than just compensation. If the owner could prove that he suffered an
economic loss during the period of restriction, the actual figure might be very important,
since it would seem that the amount of the loss should be added to the estimated
equivalent of use of the unregulated land in order to assure full just compensation for
the taking.
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controls are in force. Although the owner is still constitutionally guar-
anteed compensation, in this case he is entitled only to an award for
a limited loss of the property and not for a permanent appropriation.
The interest usually condemned in temporary taking cases is pos-
sessory.58 In these instances, courts have determined just compensation
by awarding an amount based on the fair market rental value of the
property,5 9 the normal measure of a possessory interest of limited
duration.
Unlike most temporary taking cases, however, the restrictions on
landmarks effectively appropriate a nonpossessory interest in the land.
The controls, which do not prevent an owner's continued occupation
of the structure, are in the nature of an easement that, for shorthand,
might be termed an easement of development rights.60
The fact that landmark preservation statutes authorize the taking
of an easement raises additional considerations in the valuation of the
temporary taking. Courts have traditionally determined the amount to
be awarded for appropriated easements by reference to the "before and
after" rule.61 The value of an easement is determined by subtracting
from the fair market value of the property immediately before the tak-
ing of the easement, the fair market value of the property immediately
after the interest is appropriated. The rule is necessitated by the diffi-
culty of determining any market value, let alone a fair one, for ease-
ments which are not readily bought and sold.62 Although this method
of valuation may not show the actual worth of the interest,63 the "before
and after" rule may be the only way of approximating just compen-
sation.
In cases where an easement of development rights is taken through
the imposition of controls on an historic structure, courts should deter-
mine its value by applying the "before and after" rule. The amount
thus determined would represent the value of the easement in fee. But
again, since the easement is taken for only a limited period, it would
58 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). But cf. Pomeroy v. State,
18 Misc. 2d 377, 191 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
59 E.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 38 U.S. 1 (1949).
60 For cases considering similar easements, see, e.g., South v. Texas E. Transmission Corp,.
382 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d
793 (1966); Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957).
61 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1984); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 38
(1910); United States ex rel. TVA v. Easement and Right-of-way Over 1.0 Acre of Land,
More or less, in Madison Cnty, 248 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co. v. Maze, 45 NJ. Super. 496, 13 A.2d 28 (App. Div. 1957).
62 See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Maze, 45 N.J. Super. 496, 188 A.2d 28 (App.
Div. 1957). But see West, Condemnation of Limited Use Easements, 1964 INsr. ON EMINENT
DOMAIN 109.
63 See West, supra note 62.
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be an unwarranted benefit to the owner to pay him its fee value.
Instead, the owner has lost the use of this easement of development
rights for a temporary period. Therefore, the owner should be awarded
the statutory interest rate on the fee value of the easement-an amount
which would approximate an equivalent of the lost use 84-- for the
period during which restrictions were placed on the historic structure.6 5
CONCLUSION
The recent landmark preservation laws clearly authorize public
actions amounting to unconstitutional takings of private property.
This conclusion, however, need not retard the trend toward preserva-
tion of historic structures if the rights of the owner to just compen-
sation for a taking of his property are protected. If the owner is
awarded the fair market value of his unrestricted land plus the equiva-
lent of his lost use when the landmark is permanently appropriated,
or is given the equivalent of the use of an easement of development
rights when alteration or demolition is merely prevented for a period
of time, his right to compensation for a lost property interest will be
satisfied. Moreover, the public will gain valuable time in which to
develop a means of preserving endangered historical monuments.
64 Notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. If, after removal of the restrictions,
an owner can show that the fair market value of the property is lower than its worth
prior to the imposition of controls, it would appear that the regulations have permanently
deprived him of part of his property interest. For instance, increased construction costs
or rising interest rates during the period of regulation may have permanently diminished
the market demands which originally induced the owner to request permission to change
the structure. If this is true, then the owner should be allowed to recover this decrease
in the fair market value of the land-the permanent easement-as well as the equivalent
of the use of the temporary easement of development rights.
65 There are, perhaps, two alternative methods of determining the compensation to
be awarded for the temporary taking of an easement. First, the traditional method of
compensating a temporary taking, note 59 supra, could be applied by awarding the owner
the fair market rental value of the easement. As suggested in the text, however, there
may be no market for renting easements, and, therefore, there would be no basis for
determining this value. Second, since it would appear that what the owner has actually
lost is the interest attributable to the use and enjoyment of the development of the
property over and above its utilization as a landmark, he could theoretically be made
whole by awarding him statutory interest on the fee value of the taken parcel of property,
determined before the imposition of controls, set off by an amount attributable to the
equivalent of his actual use and enjoyment of the historic property during the period of
the restrictions.
It should be noted that this is exactly the formula applied to make the award retro-
active in those cases in which the public actually condemns the land. See notes 55-57
and accompanying text supra. A somewhat complex formula, based on the value of the
whole fee and involving two differing variables, however, obscures the fact that compen-
sation is being paid for an easement, and not an estate, in land. In addition, this method
would be more difficult to apply-because of the necessity of proving more elements-
without necessarily giving more accurate results.
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